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CRIMINALIZING CORPORATE KILLING: THE
IRISH APPROACH
Bruce Carolan*

I. INTRODUCTION
The debate on criminal corporate liability in the United
States might benefit from a comparative perspective: How have
other countries treated the criminal liability of corporate entities?
This benefit might be enhanced by focusing on a country with a
similar legal heritage to the United States—a country with a
common law legal system inherited from the British. And, it
would help if that country were concurrently examining the issue
of criminal corporate liability. Interesting questions might include: What issues dominate the debate? How are issues of
punishment, reparations, and rehabilitation handled? Is a legislative approach contemplated? The purpose of this Article is to offer
one such alternate perspective, the Irish perspective.
At the end of 2010, the Irish Minister for Justice and Law Reform Dermot Ahern announced plans for the government to adopt
legislation placing the crime of corporate manslaughter on a statutory foundation, relying in part on previous research by the Irish
Law Reform Commission (LRC).1 This paper synopsizes an important research document by the LRC on the elements of a
legislative approach to corporate manslaughter.2 By reviewing the
* © 2011, Bruce Carolan. All rights reserved. Head of Department of Law, Dublin
Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland. Thank you to Professor Ellen Podgor of Stetson
University College of Law for the invitation to participate in the panel on Corporate Criminal Liability at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and to my fellow panelists
for their comments. Thanks also to Dr. Mary Rogan of the Dublin Institute of Technology
for her review of my written comments. Any mistakes are my own.
1. See Irishtimes.com, Corporate Manslaughter Bill Planned, http://www.irishtimes
.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/1229/breaking12.html (accessed Apr. 20, 2011) (explaining
that “new regulations . . . would make companies and senior managers criminally liable for
the death of employees in the workplace”).
2. L. Reform Comm’n, Report on Corporate Killing (LRC 77-2005) (available
at http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/Report%20Corporate%20Killing.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011).
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Irish suggestions, my hope is to prompt discussion and debate on
issues facing the United States on the question of corporate criminal liability.
The comparative perspective suggests, preliminarily, that the
American debate could widen and deepen if the focus included
more consideration of the remedies available under a criminal
scheme to address corporate criminal wrongdoing. Much of the
debate in the United States and in the symposium from which
this paper arises focuses on ethical issues of accountability—in
particular, whether it is ethically sound to impose penalties on
“innocent” parties for wrongdoing committed by a large, corporate
entity.3 There also is debate over the efficacy of criminal penalties
for corporate wrongdoing, with a notable absence of incarceration
as a viable penalty.4 The Irish discussion, however, has not centered on the dual issues of accountability and financial penalties.
Instead, the Irish debate includes the possibility of a range of
remedies as criminal penalties for corporate wrongdoing. 5 Discussing the possible remedies in some sense sidesteps the issues
of individual accountability and efficacy of punitive measures to
address corporate wrongdoing. These issues should be raised and
discussed in more detail in the United States debate.
II. VARYING APPROACHES TO LIABILITY FOR
CORPORATE WRONGDOING
A. The Irish Situation
Ireland has been reviewing its approach to criminalizing corporate killing for a number of years.6 In Ireland, a corporation
may be held criminally liable for wrongdoing, even when intent is
an element of the crime.7 Irish law has not, however, adopted a
3. S.E. Ass’n of L. Schs., Annual Meeting 2010 Update 16 (available
at http://sealslawschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/SEALSProgramMay24Draft2010
.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011).
4. Id.
5. See Irishtimes.com, supra n. 1 (discussing several options for penalties and remedies for corporate manslaughter).
6. L. Reform Comm’n, Criminal Law (Completed Projects) § 3.10, http://www
.lawreform.ie/welcome/criminal-law-completed-projects.251.html (accessed July 30, 2011).
7. See Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 pt. 9 s. 58 (available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2001/en.act.2001.0050.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011)
(providing for criminal liability for a corporate body, under the Act, in cases involving the
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single, stable approach to the crime of corporate manslaughter. 8
To date, as noted by the LRC, “[T]here has never been a prosecution of a corporate entity for manslaughter in Ireland.” 9 But,
prosecution for corporate manslaughter is possible in Ireland,
and, in the absence of a statutory definition, liability would be
determined by Irish courts applying the Irish common law.10 Irish
common law, in turn, relies heavily on British common law.11
Even though the United Kingdom has adopted legislation dealing
with corporate manslaughter,12 the Irish courts would turn to preexisting British common law in defining the crime of corporate
manslaughter in an Irish context.13
Therein lies the rub. British courts apply several different
approaches to the question of attributing wrongdoing to a corporate entity.14 An Irish court could thus adopt one of several
approaches on the issue of corporate manslaughter.
This instability in corporate criminal liability is problematic.
The LRC has set out to resolve the problem.15 In two major reports, the LRC has suggested a legislative solution to the
problem.16 While Ireland has not yet adopted legislation incorporating the LRC’s recommendations, Minister Ahern has
recommended that it do so.17 To more fully appreciate the ap“consent or connivance . . . [or] neglect” of a corporate officer); Competition Act, 2002 pt. 1
s. 3 (available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2002/en.act.2002.0014.pdf) (accessed
Oct. 1, 2011) (defining an “undertaking” capable of prosecution under the Act to include a
“body corporate”); Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2001 pt. 9 (available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2001/en.act.2001.0027.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011) (utilizing language similar to that of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act of
2001 in imposing corporate liability in instances of public corruption); see also L. Reform
Comm’n, Consultation Paper on Corporate Killing (LRC CP 26-2003) 19–26 (available at
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpCorporate%20Killing.pdf)
(accessed Oct. 1, 2011) (offering an overview on the state of the law regarding corporate
criminal liability in Ireland).
8. See generally L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 4–5.
11. Id.; L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 24–25.
12. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110201125714/http://legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2007/19/pdfs/ukpga_20070019_en.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011).
13. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2 at 4–5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3–7.
16. Id. at 42–43; L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 166.
17. Irishtimes.com, supra n. 1. A bill on corporate manslaughter had previously been
introduced as a private members bill, based on the LRC recommendations, but did not
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proach suggested by the LRC, it is useful to review the current,
likely common law approach to an Irish prosecution for corporate
manslaughter. As noted above, this requires consideration of the
British approach to criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing,
particularly as the British law applied before the 2007 adoption of
the United Kingdom’s Corporate Manslaughter Act.18
B. The British Approach to Corporate Manslaughter
In the United Kingdom, before the Corporate Manslaughter
Act’s 2007 adoption, the courts used various tests to assign criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing.19 Perhaps the leading
approach is the “Identification Doctrine,” which was established
in Tesco Supermarkets Limited v. Nattrass,20 a prosecution
brought against Tesco Supermarkets for a criminal violation of
the British Trade Description Act.21 The supermarket had advertised a sales price for a certain cleaning liquid. 22 A poster in the
store advertised the sale.23 When supplies ran out, a manager restocked the empty shelves with a higher-priced item but failed to
remove the poster advertising the lower price.24 A customer was
overcharged, and a criminal prosecution was brought.25
The company defended with the argument that the act of
“another person”—the branch manager—was responsible for the
wrongdoing.26 The House of Lords, in a number of opinions (each
of which might produce a different result if applied), echoed an
earlier opinion by Lord Denning, in which he analogized a corporate entity to a human body:
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body.
It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does.
progress. Id.
18. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 4–5.
19. Id.
20. [1972] A.C. 153 (HL).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 156.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 168.
26. Id. The term “another person” is used to mean any individual outside the brain or
“nerve centre” of the corporation. Id. at 171, 177–178. It is an idea used as a defense to the
imposition of corporate liability. Id. at 177–178.
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It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance
with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing
more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers
who represent the directing mind and will of the company,
and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the
law as such.27

Using H.L. Bolton, the Lords in Tesco generally agreed that
the branch manager responsible for the misadvertising was too
low in the corporate hierarchy (i.e., was the “hands” rather than
the “brain or nerve centre”) for the company to be held liable for
the violation.28 The branch manager’s acts were not the result of
controlling action by the company’s nerve centre.29 The manager
was not the company, but “another person” who broke the chain
necessary for corporate liability.30
There was considerable dispute among the Lords about who
might cause the corporation to be liable.31 Was it limited to the
board of directors, managing director, and other superior officers?
Was it the chief operating officer or other person in actual control
of the company’s day-to-day operation? Was it those identified in
the controlling documents as having high-level responsibilities?
Whatever the differences, there was clear agreement that corporate liability only resulted, if at all, from the acts of those at the
highest levels of corporate governance.32
Other British judicial opinions adopt a different approach to
assigning liability to a company based on the actions of individual
employees.33 Thus, there is not one definitive approach to criminal
27. Id. at 171 (quoting H.L. Bolton (Eng’g) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd., [1957]
1 Q.B. 159, 172).
28. Id. at 171, 180–181.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 181.
31. Id. at 187.
32. Id.
33. E.g. Meridian Global Funds Mgt. Asia Ltd. v. Sec. Comm’n, [1995] 2 A.C. 500, 502
(holding that the question of whether an individual director’s acts will be attributed to the
company is determined by looking first to the company’s constitution and laws and then to
general rules of agency); Regina v. British Steel Plc., [1995] ICR 586 (holding that an employer cannot escape liability for exposing independent contractors to risk caused by
employees simply by showing that the company’s “directing mind” took all reasonable care
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liability for corporate wrongdoing under British common law. Accordingly, for all practical purposes, Ireland—with its reliance on
the British common law in determining criminal liability for corporate manslaughter—shares the same uncertainty of approach.
C. The Irish Problem
There is no definitive common law approach to corporate
manslaughter in Ireland. In a case alleging corporate manslaughter, an Irish court would look to decisions of the British courts in
the absence of Irish legislation.34 But, as noted above, British cases are themselves uncertain as to the proper standards for
liability for corporate wrongdoing.35 Each case’s outcome would
depend upon the particular factual context.36 There is an unreported Irish decision, in which the owner and operator of an
unsafe fairground ride was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter,37 but it is unlikely that this decision would provide
much guidance in deciding the criminal liability of a large corporation. An Irish court would be free to cite to and rely on any of
the foregoing British cases as persuasive authority in deciding
corporate criminal liability for manslaughter.38 This presents an
unstable environment in which to operate business, and also
threatens unequal results for society in prosecutions for criminal
liability for corporate killing.

to discharge its duty); Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading v. Pioneer Concrete, [1995] ICR 25, 25–26
(holding the company in contempt of court because employees ignored prohibition against
making agreements, even though prohibition was followed at senior level).
34. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 4–5.
35. See supra n. 33 (listing various British cases).
36. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 5.
37. See L. Reform Comm’n, Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter 85–
86 (LRC 87-2008) http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rMurderandInvoluntaryMS
.pdf (accessed July 30, 2011) (reporting on the decision in The People (DPP) v. Cullagh
(1998) in which the owner of a chairoplane ride at a funfair that malfunctioned and killed
a rider was found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter for failing to inspect and make
repairs to the twenty-year-old ride).
38. See supra n. 33 (citing British cases).
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III. THE IRISH SOLUTION
A. Corporate Liability
The LRC recommends that “as the current [common] law of
corporate liability for manslaughter does not provide a clear basis
for constructing liability, a new basis, contained in legislative
form, is necessary.”39 The LRC sets out to address the various
complexities that arise when using legislation to stabilize criminal liability for corporate killing. 40
The LRC notes certain issues that must be addressed in any
legislative solution. The first issue is the “paradox of size.” 41 This
means, the smaller the corporate entity, the more likely it is that
an individual’s acts can be ascribed to the company.42 This makes
it more likely that a larger company will escape liability due to a
large, complex chain of command. For example, in the English
case of R. v. Kite and OLL Limited,43 the acts of the managing
director of a one-man firm led directly to the company’s conviction
for manslaughter.44 On the other hand, in R. v. P & O European
Ferries (Dover) Limited,45 an official inquiry into the deaths surrounding the sinking of a passenger ferry found deficiencies
throughout the company’s operation, yet the company escaped
liability for corporate manslaughter because no individual could
be found liable for manslaughter.46
Thus, the LRC believes that “a statutory formulation for corporate killing should take account of different sizes of corporate
entities to which the offence would apply.”47 This issue could be
given added prominence in the United States debate, to better
inform the accountability issue in corporate criminal liability.
The LRC notes that an approach to corporate killing that focuses on the criminal law runs the risk of not being as sufficiently
39. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 5.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 5–6.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994; The Independent 9 December 1994
(cited by L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 6).
44. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 6 (citing Kite, Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994; The Independent 9 December 1994).
45. [1991] 93 Cr App R 72 (cited by L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 6).
46. Id.
47. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 7.
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proactive as other, civil approaches. 48 For example, an agency
charged with inspecting, reporting, and possibly fining companies
for unsafe conditions might be more effective than the after-thefact approach of punishing corporate killing through the criminal
law.49 Nevertheless, on the basis of deterrence, public censure,
and consistency, the LRC is of the view that “criminal liability for
manslaughter is an appropriate means of dealing with death
caused by corporate wrongdoing.”50 As will become apparent, by
providing greater flexibility in the penalties available to punish
this corporate crime, the proposed approach addresses some of the
concerns over the effectiveness of criminally prosecuting corporations.
The LRC also recognizes the difficulty of establishing the
mental element of a crime when a corporation is the defendant,
even though intent is recognized as something a corporation can
possess.51 For example, it is highly doubtful that a corporation can
be guilty of murder in Ireland.52 The LRC identifies this difficulty
of proving intent as an issue to be addressed in formulating proposed legislation. 53 Still, this does not bar prosecution of a
corporation for manslaughter, because there are two categories of
manslaughter recognized in Irish law: voluntary and involuntary.54 Voluntary manslaughter requires intent, as it amounts to
an intentional killing with extenuating circumstances.55
Involuntary manslaughter is divided into two categories:
“manslaughter by a criminal and dangerous act and manslaughter by gross negligence.” 56 The LRC recommends that the most
appropriate category for criminal liability for corporate killing is
involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence,57 and then identifies four elements of gross-negligence manslaughter: (1) the
accused was, by ordinary objective standards, negligent; (2) the
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 16 (describing an English case in which a corporation was found guilty of
conspiring to defraud because “the intent of the managing director could be attributed to
the defendant company”).
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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negligence caused the death of the victim; (3) the negligence was
of a very high degree; and (4) the negligence involved a high degree of risk or likelihood of substantial personal injury to others.58
B. Individual Liability
The issues of individual liability and corporate liability are
intertwined.59 Apart from the previous discussion of the “paradox
of size,” the issue of corporate liability depends upon the view of
the company as the sum of its parts (atomized view) or as an entity in itself (organic view).60 A completely atomized view of the
company might remove all likelihood of corporate liability for
manslaughter, as the acts of individuals might not be ascribed to
the company.61
The LRC “considers that a well[-]formulated scheme of corporate culpability would look separately at the liability of the
corporate entity and the individuals within it.”62 The LRC then
concludes:
[C]orporate liability for manslaughter [should] be based on a
test of gross negligence, formulated around a breach of duty.
While the test will be applied to the entity as a whole, regard
should be had to the wrongdoing of individuals within the
entity when assessing whether the corporate entity has
breached its duty.63

IV. CONSTRUCTION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
A. Introduction
Using gross negligence manslaughter as the applicable culpability standard largely removes the issue of subjective intent,
which would be problematic with a corporate defendant, and replaces it with a more objective standard.64 To define this
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. (citing The People (Att’y Gen.) v. Dunleavy [1948] IR 95).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 47.

File: Carolan.Galley.Final.docx

166

Created on: 12/5/2011 4:31:00 PM

Stetson Law Review

Last Printed: 12/5/2011 4:41:00 PM

[Vol. 41

standard, the LRC has referred to the United States Model Penal
Code Section 2.02(2)(d), which provides the following elements for
criminal negligence:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s
situation.65

Employing these criteria and those derived from the Irish
law, the LRC, as a preliminary matter, “recommends that these
elements should form the basis of the test of corporate liability for
manslaughter: (a) [t]he undertaking was negligent; (b) [t]he negligence was of a sufficiently high degree to be characteri[z]ed as
‘gross’ and so warrant criminal sanction; and (c) [t]he negligence
caused the death.”66
The remainder of this Article will more closely consider aspects of these elements and the recommended sanctions for
corporate manslaughter.
B. Standard of Culpability
The proposed Irish legislative standard of liability for corporate manslaughter is gross negligence.67 The LRC describes gross
negligence as a crime of capacity rather than of autonomy.68 That
is, a person is guilty of gross negligence if he or she had the capacity to avoid the harm caused. 69 This standard is objective, and it
avoids an inquiry into the corporation’s mental intent for the
crime because no autonomous act is needed to prove gross negligence.70 The LRC explains that “[w]hat is at issue is that [a
65. Id. at 49 (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (ALI 1985)).
66. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 47.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 193–194 (4th ed., Oxford
U. Press 2003)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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corporation] can be said to have the capacity to take the requisite
level of care to avoid the commission of manslaughter.”71
While citing The People (Attorney General) v. Dunleavy, the
LRC describes the elements of gross negligence manslaughter as
comprising that:


the accused was, by ordinary objective standards,
negligent;



the negligence caused the death of the victim;



the negligence was of a very high degree; and



the negligence involved a high degree of risk or likelihood of substantial personal injury to others.72

C. First Element: Negligence
The first element, negligence, requires a finding that the defendant owed the deceased a duty of care.73 Rather than
comprehensively defining the issue by legislation, the LRC recommends that “whether [a corporation] owed a deceased a duty of
care should be established based on existing common law rules
and statutory duties.”74 The LRC, however, goes on to recommend
that a “non-exhaustive, indicative list” of duties—such as the duty
of a landowner, employer, or producer of goods to relevant parties—be included in any statutory scheme.75 Once a duty of care is
established, it is necessary when determining negligence to consider what standard of care is required. 76 For a human person,
the standard of care is one of the reasonable person. 77 This standard does not easily translate to a corporate defendant.78 The LRC
“recommends that the standard of care should require the [corporation] to take all reasonable measures to anticipate and prevent
71. Id. (citing L. Comm’n of Eng. & Wales, Consultation Paper on Involuntary Manslaughter ¶ 5.77 (LAWCOM No. 135 1994)).
72. Id. at 48.
73. Id. at 50.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 51.
76. Id. at 52.
77. Id. (citing Dunleavy, [1948] IR at 102).
78. Id.
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risks of death or serious personal harm, having due regard to the
[corporation’s] size and circumstances.”79
With regard to the standard of care, the LRC deems it relevant to consider “the way in which the organi[z]ation’s activities
are managed or organi[z]ed by its high managerial agents,”80 to
“the regulatory environment in which the undertaking operates,”81 as well as to “any corporate assurance systems that the
undertaking subscribes to.”82 It is also important, in the LRC’s
view, to consider “whether the senior management sought to profit from the breach of duty.”83 The LRC also recommends that a
court should, when deciding the issue of gross negligence, “drill
down” into the organization’s management structure, and consider “[t]he allocation of responsibility within the undertaking; [t]he
procedural decision making rules of the undertaking; [and] [t]he
policies of the undertaking.”84 The LRC refers to this as the “corporate culture,”85 and also recommends considering “[t]he training
and supervision of employees by the undertaking [and] [t]he response of the undertaking to previous incidents involving a risk of
death or serious personal harm.”86
D. Second Element: “Gross” Nature of Negligence
The second element of the proposed crime of corporate manslaughter is gross negligence. 87 This must be distinguished from
ordinary negligence.88 But, it is difficult to define with precision
when negligence is sufficiently gross to warrant a criminal conviction for corporate manslaughter. The LRC notes the risk of
circularity in the definition: “[i]f members of the jury ask how
negligent [a defendant] must have been if they are to convict of

79. Id. at 53.
80. Id. at 55.
81. Id. at 56.
82. Id.
83. Id. The report also states that the profit motive is not a factor in determining guilt
or liability, but it may become an issue for sentencing. Id.
84. Id. at 57.
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id. at 57–58.
87. Id. at 59.
88. Id. at 17.

File: Carolan.Galley.Final.docx

2011]

Created on: 12/5/2011 4:31:00 PM

Last Printed: 12/5/2011 4:41:00 PM

Criminalizing Corporate Killing: The Irish Approach

169

manslaughter, the answer is ‘so negligent as to deserve conviction
for manslaughter.’”89
The LRC recommends the approach adopted in Dunleavy90 to
define gross negligence.91 According to the LRC, “[t]he negligence
will be characteri[z]ed as ‘gross’ if it: (a) was of a very high degree;
and (b) involved a significant risk of death or serious personal
harm.”92
E. Third Element: Causation
The third element of corporate manslaughter is causation.93
The issue posed with respect to causation is the likelihood that a
corporate defendant may successfully interpose the defense of
novus actus interveniens.94 That is, a corporation might argue that
an act of an employee broke the chain of causation for the corporate offense.95
For that reason, the LRC suggests “that the corporate acts
should be ‘a cause’ as opposed to ‘the immediate cause’ of death.” 96
Therefore, the LRC “recommends that the normal rules of causation should apply to corporate manslaughter.”97
V. SANCTIONS FOR CORPORATIONS
A. Introduction
It is in the areas of sanctions for corporate manslaughter that
the Irish approach may have the most valuable insights to offer
for the American debate. The common-sense observations about
the nature of the corporate defendant and the range of options
available in imposing sanctions on a corporate defendant deserve
89. Id. at 59 (quoting Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 299 (4th ed.,
Oxford U. Press 2003)).
90. [1948] I.R. 95, 100 (Ir.).
91. See L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 60 (recommending that the two factors defined in Dunleavy be adopted to provide guidance to a court in distinguishing gross
negligence from civil negligence).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 61.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 60 (citing Charleton, McDermott & Bolger, Criminal Law ¶ 7.23 (Butterworths 1999)).
97. Id. at 62.
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to be highlighted in consideration of corporate criminal liability
under United States law.
The LRC believes that rehabilitation of a corporate offender
may be more likely than rehabilitation of a human criminal defendant.98 In the case of a corporate defendant, changes to the
“corporate culture,” or replacement of personnel who are responsible for creating the unsafe conditions that resulted in death,
may greatly reduce the likelihood of the defendant reoffending. In
the case of the convicted human, the causes of the offense may be
hidden deep within the human psyche and impervious to
change—and therefore conviction and sanction may be unlikely to
prevent reoffense. These observations shape the LRC’s recommendations regarding sanctions for a corporate defendant.99
Nevertheless, there should be some similarities to the sanctions process for both human and corporate defendants. Perhaps
most importantly, the LRC recommends a pre-sentence report in
both cases.100 This will help the judge in sentencing and, in the
case of an appeal, provide a transparent basis for assessing such
matters as the amount of the fine.
B. Sanctions
1. Fines
The LRC recommends that unlimited fines be available to
punish corporate defendants convicted of manslaughter.101 It
notes several criticisms regarding the use of fines.102 First, fines
can create the public impression that corporations can “buy their
way out” of corporate manslaughter offenses.103 Attempts to avoid
this problem, however, can lead to another problem known as a
“deterrence trap,” in which the only fine sufficient to impose sufficient deterrence may be so large that a corporate defendant
cannot pay it.104 On the other hand, a number of corporate de98. Id. at 79.
99. Id. at 79–80.
100. Id. at 80.
101. Id. at 82.
102. Id. at 81.
103. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 18.
104. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 81 (citing Paul C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn:
No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79
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fendants are non-commercial bodies. 105 Imposing a large fine on a
public-sector body will have a far different effect than a similar
fine on a for-profit organization.106
There is also the question of properly calibrating the amount
of the fine. The LRC recommends against aligning the amount of
the fine with turnover (as is the case with certain antitrust fines)
because this might underpenalize corporations that are asset-rich
but have comparatively low turnovers.107
Nevertheless, the LRC “recommends that a court sentencing
[a corporation] convicted of corporate manslaughter should have
the power to impose an unlimited fine.”108
2. Remedial Orders
In addition to the use of fines as a means of disciplining corporations found guilty of corporate manslaughter, the LRC also
explains the potential value in the use of remedial orders:
Remedial orders can potentially be excellent rehabilitative
tools; by examining where the corporation went wrong, a
remedial order can require the [corporation] to take the necessary steps to remedy the problem . . . [T]he conditions
imposed could require the undertaking to conduct an internal investigation into the circumstances of the occurrence of
the corporate killing offen[s]e, followed by appropriate internal disciplinary proceedings, and the filing of a satisfactory
compliance report with the court.109

For these reasons, the LRC “recommends that a court sentencing an undertaking for corporate manslaughter should have
the option of imposing a remedial order.”110

Mich. L. Rev. 386, 390 (1981)).
105. Id. at 82.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 81.
108. Id. at 82.
109. Id. at 83.
110. Id. at 84.
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3. Community Service Orders
The LRC, on balance, recommends that community service
orders be available to the sentencing court imposing a sanction
against a company convicted of corporate manslaughter. 111 The
LRC, however, does recognize several drawbacks to this sentencing approach, and suggests certain methods of mitigating these
drawbacks. First, because the community service will be performed by employees paid by the corporation, it may again appear
that the company is buying its way out of a conviction—and with
the use of forced labor.112 Second, there is the possibility that the
community service will be directed to the court’s pet charity, or
used as an alternative to the expenditure of government resources
on matters for which the government should rightly pay.113
The LRC would get around these difficulties by adopting an
approach recommended by the LRC of Australia:
(i)

Community service orders should be available at the
discretion of the court;

(ii)

If, after finding that a corporation has contravened
the Act, the court decides that a community service
order would be the appropriate penalty option . . . it
should indicate this to the corporation and ask it to
prepare a report on a community service project it
could perform in lieu of, or in addition to, a monetary
penalty;

(iii)

If the contravener does not propose a project, or the
court rejects its proposal, the court should specify the
project to be undertaken or impose a different type of
penalty;

(iv)

Community service projects should be required to
bear a reasonable relationship to the contravention.
This requirement is necessary to prevent community
service orders being used to promote ‘pet charities.’ In
determining the nature of a community service the
court should be required to consider what, if any,
damage was suffered by the community as a whole as

111. Id. at 91.
112. Id. at 89.
113. Id.
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a result of the contravention, and to require a reasonable relationship between the community service
project and the nature of the damage;
(v)

If more supervision is required than could be performed by the court, the court should appoint a
person to be an independent representative of the
court. This representative could, for example, be a
lawyer, accountant, auditor, receiver or other appropriately qualified person. He or she would supervise
compliance with the project and, if necessary, prepare
reports on a proposed project. The fees of such a person would be payable by the contravener.114

4. Adverse Publicity Orders
An adverse publicity order would serve several useful functions according to the LRC.115 Such a response would not only
counteract the perception that a company was buying its way out
of an offense by paying a fine, but also would express public disapproval of the offense in a way that a simple fine or remedial
order might not.116 An adverse publicity order:
[W]ould require the convicted undertaking to publici[z]e the
fact of a conviction for corporate manslaughter at its own
expense; the undertaking might be required to write to
shareholders and/or customers or it might be required to
place an advertisement in a local or national newspaper. The
precise content of such publicity would be set by the court.117

114.
at
.pdf)).
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 90–91 (quoting L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 199–200 (2003) (available
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpCorporate%20Killing
Id. at 91–93.
Id. at 91–92
Id. at 91.
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5. Restraining Orders/Injunctions
The LRC believes that the existing Irish law regarding restraining orders and injunctions is adequate for the range of
sanctions it is imposing and does not recommend a change.118
VI. CONCLUSION
The LRC has recommended various changes in the law to reduce or eliminate uncertainties in Irish law regarding corporate
manslaughter.119 These recommendations contain valuable insights for the American legal debate on corporate criminal
liability. First, there is the issue of whether a more legislatively
based approach would be suitable in the United States, particularly given the debate over the initial legitimacy of the common
law basis for corporate criminal liability. A legislative approach
might address some of the uncertainties arising due to the common law origins of the doctrine in the United States.
The proposed approach by the LRC also highlights the issue
of the proper sanctions to be imposed upon a corporate defendant.
The focus on sanctions “de-centers” two of the principal issues in
the American debate: (1) the ethical soundness of imposing criminal liability on a corporation due to spillover effects on arguably
“innocent” parties; and (2) the effectiveness of criminal sanctions—particularly fines—that may be passed on to the customers
of the corporation.
By following the Irish debate and the subsequent introduction of legislation criminalizing corporate killing, American legal
observers may gain fresh insights to inform the ongoing debate
within the United States.

118. Id. at 94.
119. See generally id. (listing a multitude of findings and recommendations for the
treatment of corporations found guilty of committing corporate manslaughter in Ireland).

